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This article examines the dynamics of the relationship between residential and school 
segregation in Barcelona. The analysis explores which educational and non-educational drivers 
foster the school segregation of foreign students between the city’s neighbourhoods. The article 
also analyses to what extent the particularities of Barcelona’s admissions policy, which 
combines catchment areas with high levels of school choice, generates specific mechanisms of 
contextually bound school segregation within the local education market. The results confirm 
that residential segregation and educational segregation are two interrelated phenomena in 
Barcelona. In addition, the supply of publicly subsidized private schooling in the 
neighbourhoods is a main factor of both educational segregation and isolation, especially in 
those neighbourhoods with a high concentration of foreign pupils. Based on the results, the 
article elaborates on the challenges for local education policymaking to address the dynamics 




Social inequalities have increased in many urban spaces in the globalized world. Economic 
growth and social development have been unequally distributed and have caused urban 
fragmentation and segmentation across neighbourhoods. Globalization and polarization have 
	 2 
occurred simultaneously, even within cities in countries with strong welfare regimes (Musterd 
et al. 2017). Moreover, the increase in social inequality since the mid-1970s and the incapacity 
of governments to use public and social policies to reduce it (Atkinson, 2015) have contributed 
to a worsening of socioeconomic segregation in major cities. Socioeconomic spatial 
segregation has increased because of all these trends, although its intensity and characteristics 
vary, depending on factors such as pre-existing urban segregation, the processes of economic 
restructuring, the development and transformation of welfare states or the characteristics of 
housing policies (Musterd and Ostendorf, 1998; Tammaru et al., 2015). Socioeconomic 
fragmentation and urban polarization particularly affect migrant groups in the context of 
increasing immigration flows. A recent report by the OECD (2018a) underlines significant 
clustering and isolation processes of migrant population in EU cities, higher levels of spatial 
concentration of the poorest migrant groups and a positive relationship between their spatial 
segregation and urban poverty (OECD, 2018a: 16). 
 
Barcelona has not been immune to processes of social fragmentation and increasing spatial 
inequalities, which have affected especially migrant population. The arrival of more than 
300,000 people in one decade (Galeano and Bayona, 2015: 119) altered the social and ethnic 
composition of Barcelona’s districts and its metropolitan area. Between 2000 and 2016, the 
foreign population rose from 46,091 to 284,907 inhabitants1, an increase of 518% and they 
nowadays represent 16.6% of the total population of the city. Migration starts mainly in Asia 
(25.2%), South America (21.7%), Southern Europe (12.6%) and North Africa (5.6%). The 
most represented countries of origin are Italy (9.7%), Pakistan (7.2%), China (6.9%), Morocco 
(4.7%) and Bolivia (3.5%) (Ajuntament de Barcelona, 2016). Migrant groups have particularly 
																																																						
1 Data from Institut d’Estadística de Catalunya 
http://www.idescat.cat/poblacioestrangera/?b=0&geo=mun:080193&nac=d208). 
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suffered the effects of economic crisis regarding unemployment, material deprivation or access 
to housing (Alonso et al. 2015). 
 
Migration inflows reaching Barcelona and other Spanish cities have substantially increased the 
share of foreign students in the Spanish education system. In 2000, the number of students with 
non-Spanish nationality accounted for only 2% of all students in primary education, yet by 
2009, that figure had reached 12%, it then stabilized after the international economic crisis to 
around 9% (MECD, 2017). Migration inflows and demographic trends have put pressure on 
education authorities to integrate foreign pupils into preschool and compulsory education. 
While access to compulsory education has been guaranteed for all children, between-school 
segregation of foreign and low Socio-Economic Status (SES) students has increased 
significantly, so that Spain is one of the European countries that has a higher social segregation 
of schools (Alegre and Ferrer, 2010: 447).  
 
Residential segregation, middle-class families’ strategies of school choice and the school 
supply characteristics at a local level are key drivers of school segregation of vulnerable 
students (van Zanten, 2005; Maloutas, 2007; Boterman, 2013). The interaction between all 
these factors produces strong school segregation, as well as a concentration of foreign students 
in specific schools within city neighbourhoods, which is significantly higher than their 
residential segregation (Bonal, 2012). 
 
This article seeks to analyse which local and contextual factors influence school segregation of 
foreign students focusing on the case of Barcelona as an example of a city that has experienced 
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large migration inflows in the last decades2 as well as experiencing a significant impact of the 
economic crisis on spatial inequalities. High unemployment rates, a significant increase in 
income inequality, an increase in poverty rates and a lack of social housing have increased 
residential segregation in the city between the foreign and non-foreign population and among 
income groups (Nel·lo and Blanco, 2014; Sánchez Castro, 2014). The close link between 
residential and school segregation (Frankenberg, 2013; Hamnett and Butler, 2013) has 
undoubtedly transferred these spatial tensions to the school level, especially in a city that had 
already experienced significant levels of school segregation between foreign and non-foreign 
students even before the economic crisis (Síndic de Greuges, 2008). The case of Barcelona is 
of particular interest since school segregation may be favoured by a quasi-market system that 
provides a significant choice to families. In addition, the distribution of different nationalities 
among districts and neighbourhoods (Bayona and López-Gay, 2011) and their patterns of 
school choice may potentially explain the different relationship between residential and school 
segregation. 
 
The article is structured as follows. In the next section we describe the main characteristics of 
the spatial distribution of foreign students in Barcelona by world region’s nationality. The 
section after presents the main characteristics of the Spanish quasi-market education system, 
including a description of the school admissions policy and the school catchment area system 
in Barcelona. We proceed by describing first the data and the methods used for analysing the 
school segregation and concentration (or isolation3) of foreign pupils. The section after that 
evaluates the relationship between the school distribution of foreign pupils and different 
																																																						
2 Catalonia, and Barcelona in particular, received a high number of migrants from Southern Spanish regions in 
the 1960s and 1970s. This internal migration was estimated to involve one million people in the mid-1970s and 
constituted a great challenge in terms of social and educational integration.  
3 The isolation index is the most common way to measure concentration. The index estimates the probability of 
an immigrant student sharing a school with other immigrant students. In this context, isolation and concentration 
can be taken as synonymous.   
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educational and non-educational factors for the 10 city districts and for all their 
neighbourhoods. This section precedes the analysis of the plausible drivers of school 
segregation and isolation in the city neighbourhoods of Barcelona. Finally, we conclude, 
considering some policy implications of our results. 
 
Migration and residential segregation in Barcelona  
 
The rapid increase of migration in Barcelona was particularly acute at the beginning of the 21st 
century. According to the city council’s estimates, while foreign residents accounted for 3.5% 
of all residents in 2000, this figure reached 18.1% in 2009. After that year, the economic crisis 
decelerated the arrival of foreign population to the city (Melguizo and Royuela, 2017) and in 
2016, 16.6% of the city’s population were foreign and 23% were born abroad (including 
foreign-born people who had obtained Spanish citizenship) and around 30% had a foreign 
background (OECD, 2018b). 
 
Despite the reduction in the arrival of foreigners after the economic crisis, the residential 
segregation of the foreign population increased after 2009 (Nel·lo and Blanco, 2015). Income 
inequality widened in the wake of the economic crisis, especially between foreign residents 
(women in particular) and Spanish nationals (OECD, 2018b: 34). The economic crisis 
particularly affected migrant groups regarding labour market participation and income and 
converted foreign origin is one of the key factors that increases the probability of being poor 
or belonging to the bottom sector of income distribution (Parella, 2016).  
 
In Barcelona, the level of concentration of different ethnic groups varies. Moroccans and 
Pakistanis have higher residential segregation indexes, while Latin American or Western 
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European migration shows more peripheralization (Arbaci and Malheiros, 2009: 237; 
Dominguez et al., 2010: 8). Figure 1 shows the spatial distribution of the non-EU foreign 
population in the city. District 1 has the highest concentration of non-EU citizens, with 
Pakistani and Chinese groups being the most represented. This is the historic urban centre of 
the city, which is a place of arrival and settlement. However, the most reproduced residential 
pattern is the presence of non-EU foreign populations in peripheral working-class 
neighbourhoods (Bayona and López-Gay, 2011: 384). 
 









Despite the unequal spatial distribution of foreign populations, the overall level of residential 
segregation may be considered moderate, with recent estimations of a general dissimilarity 
index of 0.3 for the overall foreign population and under 0.5 for most nationalities (Galeano 
and Bayona, 2015: 122). Still, while this model of urban segregation might explain lower levels 
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of inter-district segregation of the foreign population, it does not exclude high levels of intra-
district segregation. At the neighbourhood level, foreign population segregation could be equal 
or higher than that observed in Northern European cities (Musterd and Fullando, 2008). In 
short, relatively low segregation values do not correctly report the exclusion of residential 
marginalization derived from limited access to good housing and labour informality. 
Interestingly, the specificities of the spatial dispersion and residential marginalization of the 
foreign population in the city make it particularly relevant to observe within-district and within-
neighbourhood processes of spatial polarization. The internal inequalities within 
neighbourhoods and the particularities of local education markets can play a decisive role in 
understanding processes of school segregation. 
 
School admissions policy in Barcelona in a quasi-market education system 
 
Despite the existence of a common curriculum in compulsory education and the absence of 
early tracking (Mons, 2007), the level of social inclusion in Spanish schools is below the OECD 
average4. The quasi-market characteristic of the Spanish education system contributes to a 
greater social school segregation. This is because of higher parental school choice, unequal 
access of different social groups to public and publicly subsidized private schools and different 
patterns of choice among social groups, including native ‘white flight’ and migrants’ school 
closure and emulation (Farre et al., 2018).  
 
																																																						
4 The PISA index of social inclusion measures the degree to which students from different socioeconomic 
backgrounds attend the same school or the degree to which different schools have students with different 
socioeconomic profiles (OECD, 2015: 3).  The index varies between 0 and 100. The higher value of the index the 
higher level of social inclusion.  According to PISA 2015, the index of social inclusion for Spain was 69, while 
the OECD average was 76.5.   
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The historical inhibition of the state in education consolidated a private education sector which 
has retained a significant share of the education market, even following a progressive increase 
in the quality and quantity of public education since the democratic transition (Bonal, 2012). 
Today, the publicly subsidized private sector accounts for 25% of the student population. In 
Barcelona, the proportion of children in compulsory schooling attending private subsidized 
schools is 56.6%, while 41.2% of students attend public schools, with only 2% enrolled in 
private independent schools (CEB, 2017). Private subsidized schools are highly diverse, both 
regarding their school ethos and their economic conditions. Around 60% of all private 
subsidized schools are Catholic schools, while the rest adopt different legal forms such as 
associations, cooperatives or foundations. While some schools are “like public schools” and 
are open to all students, others charge de facto high school fees5 (in the form of voluntary 
contributions), which prevent most low-income students from attending. Despite these 
differences, all private subsidized schools are under the same regulations as public schools 
regarding school admissions, curriculum obligations and other requirements and standards 
regarding material resources, facilities and teaching staff (Villarroya, 2000). However, the 
formal equality of the system does not impede public schools from assuming the highest share 
of foreign students (81.1%), while only the 13.6% of them attend private subsidized schools 
and the rest are enrolled in private independent schools (MECD, 2017). 
 
School admission policy in Spain was originally established by the 8/1985  Organic Law of the 
Right to Education6. This Education Act constructed a unique system of admissions policy to 
																																																						
5 A recent study carried out in the city of Barcelona estimates that despite formal gratuity, most publicly subsidized 
private school and many public schools charge fees to parents (in the form of voluntary contributions). The average 
private cost of schooling in the richest district of Barcelona is 1640€, while this cost is 634€ in the poorest district 
(with a reduced presence of publicly subsidized private schools) (Bonal and Zancajo, 2019). 6	In Spain, basic education is organized into three education levels: preschool (3-5 years-old); primary (6-11 
years-old) and lower secondary education (12-16 years old). Despite the fact that preschool is not a compulsory 
education level, it is almost universal (the rate of enrolment is over 94%). As a result, the school admission 
process takes place at the preschool education level.	
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both public and private subsidized schools. According to these regulations, all publicly 
financed schools should be free of charge, not allowed to select their student population and 
had to guarantee the participation of parents and teachers in school decision-making through 
school council bodies. Parents have the capacity to express their school preferences and 
students are assigned following the Boston mechanism7. In cases of overly high demand, 
applications are prioritized using different criteria, which include residential proximity, the 
enrolment of siblings at the school and household income. This system of school access 
converts the Spanish education system into a quasi-market model: families can choose a school 
freely but the state has the capacity to intervene in situations of overdemand, while schools 
have no formal capacity to select their student population.  
 
While the main regulations of school admissions are common, regional governments have an 
extensive capacity for defining their own education policies. Regional governments may decide 
on the characteristics of school supply (e.g., opening schools or closing/opening new 
classrooms), define the limits of school catchment areas if applicable (public and private 
subsidized schools share the same areas) or establish criteria for compensatory policies and 
school budget distribution. In addition, regional governments establish criteria aiming to ensure 
a balanced distribution of Students with Special Needs (SSN) among all schools. Schools must 
reserve a number of places for SSN pupils8 until the end of the pre-enrolment process. Those 
schools without demand for SSN may then fill the available places with other pupils. While 
this system leaves no margin for schools to select their student population, the absence of 
																																																						
7 The so-called ‘Boston mechanism’ is a student placement procedure, through which students (or their families) 
submit their preference lists. Given the reported preferences, the allocation of school places follows an algorithm 
that maximizes students’ preferences, subject to the pre-specified priorities of students at each school; places at 
each school are allocated based on students’ rank.	
8 SSN students include those with physical or mental disabilities as well as socially disadvantaged and migrant 
students having late enrolment into the education system. Professional teams from the regional Department of 
Education oversee the identification and classification of SSN students.	
	 10 
demand from SSN students for school places in some schools explains their unequal 
distribution among public and private schools9. 
 
In Barcelona, school admissions policy is managed by the Consorci d’Educació (CEB), a 
public body formed by representatives of the Catalan regional government and the city council. 
In 2006, the CEB established a distinctive system of school choice. Although 29 catchment 
areas of access to compulsory education were defined, a minimum common choice capacity 
was established. While each family could choose all the schools located within the catchment 
area, a minimum of six schools (three public and three private subsidized) should be guaranteed 
as proximity schools. This system was modified in 2012, widening school choice for all 
families. The minimum number of schools considered as proximity schools doubled. 
Considering the oversupply of schools in certain areas of the city, the estimated average of 
proximity schools per family increased from 7.9 to 16.7 schools. By shifting school choice 
possibilities, the CEB tried to compensate for the unequal internal distribution of school 
catchment areas (which differ both in the overall number of schools and in public/private 
distribution), while attempting to reduce the supposedly strong relationship between residential 
and school segregation. By allowing for greater choice possibilities, it was expected that 
families living in poorer neighbourhoods of the city would have a way out of local schools, 
reducing overall school segregation. 
 
Despite there being no specific assessment of the effects of extending school choice 
possibilities, school segregation in Barcelona remained stable between 2006 and 2016, 
increasing slightly even in some districts (Síndic de Greuges, 2016). Thus, as in other European 
																																																						
9 In Barcelona, 68.7% of SSN students starting the school year 2018-19 are enrolled in public schools (despite 
public schools hosting only 49.5% of enrolments) while 31.3% are enrolled in private subsidized schools. See 
https://ajuntament.barcelona.cat/premsa/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/180907_NDP_inici_curs.pdf.  
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cities, expanding choice for all families appears not to have altered spatial educational 
inequalities (see, for instance, articles by Boterman (2019), Ramos Lobato and Groos (2019), 
or Cordini et al. (2019) in this special issue). This could be related to two main	phenomena: 
firstly, a moderate-weak relationship between residential segregation and school segregation 
in the city, and secondly, the significant differences in choice patterns between middle and 
lower classes (and ethnic minorities), which have different demand rationalities, choice 
possibilities and diverging preferences (Bonal and Zancajo, 2018). Evidence for school choice 
patterns in Barcelona confirms the heterogeneous choice sets and priorities among families 
depending on their social origin or their country of origin (Alegre and Benito, 2012). However, 
there is less evidence regarding the potential effects of residential segregation on school 
segregation of foreign students, an aspect that we try to elucidate herein. 
 
Interestingly, a moderate level of residential segregation and a potentially equitable school 
admissions system do not translate into high levels of educational inclusion. Indeed, the school 
segregation of foreign students is notably high in certain neighbourhoods. Several reasons may 
explain this apparent contradiction. Firstly, it is true that all Spanish regions can establish 
income thresholds in order to give priority to low-income families in the case of excessive 
demand for a specific school. Most regions, however, including Barcelona, set thresholds that 
apply to very poor families, usually those in receipt of less than the minimum wage. Doing this 
restricts the choice priority to the very poor rather than to a broader range of low SES families. 
Secondly, as argued before, while publicly funded private schools cannot charge school fees, 
some of them do ask for “voluntary” contributions to carry out complementary or 
extracurricular activities, a practice that de facto results in monthly payments. While this is 
common practice in publicly subsidized private schools, some public schools (through parental 
associations) also ask for family contributions to provide a richer educational experience for 
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their children. These practices discriminate directly against the many who cannot afford such 
extra payments10 by preventing them from applying to “expensive” schools or even by 
excluding them from participating in specific school activities (Villarroya, 2000). Thirdly, the 
rapid increase in foreign students has generated processes of ‘white flight’, whereby the local 
population migrates from public to subsidized private schools with the most advantaged 
socioeconomic school composition. In addition, the raise of foreign population has also boosted 
processes of cultural emulation in terms of school choice: foreign families copy the options 
taken by families with similar cultural backgrounds, which increases the concentration of 
foreign students in particular schools (Bonal, 2012). There have been significant gentrification 
processes in the most urbanized spaces, but they have not been able to reduce school 
segregation (Síndic de Greuges, 2016). Strategies adopted by families when choosing schools 
produce processes of differentiation within gentrified neighbourhoods and make it possible for 
middle-class families to avoid those schools with a higher proportion of disadvantaged 
students. As in other European countries (Rostas and Kostka, 2014; Dupriez et al., 2018) and 
despite the availability of legal and political instruments to regulate such dynamics, education 
and social policies have been mostly unable to compensate for inequalities in the distribution 
of ethnic minority students or students from low-income families. Instruments such as the 
reservation of places at schools for at-risk students, the balanced distribution of latecomers 
between all publicly funded schools or systems for controlling fraud perpetrated by parents or 
schools have been disregarded to be used as potential desegregation measures by policymakers 




10 Cost differences between public and subsidized private schools are explained partly by reduced public funding 
to private schools, which receive fewer funds per capita than public schools. Private spending in public schools 
accounts for 38.7% of the private spending in subsidized private schools (Rogero and Andrés- Candelas, 2014). 
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Data and methods 
 
Our analysis aims to elucidate the main determinants of school segregation of foreign pupils in 
primary education in Barcelona. We opt for primary education (pupils aged between three and 
twelve years old) because this is the educational level with the highest school segregation of 
foreign pupils11. We use two data sources. The primary education level data were retrieved 
from the CEB database and refer to the 2016-17 academic year. They include information about 
schools, catchment areas, neighbourhoods and districts. The socioeconomic characteristics of 
the neighbourhoods were extracted from the publicly available statistics produced by 
Barcelona City Council and refer to 201512. Taken together, they represent the latest currently 
available data at the time of writing. Due to the limits of the administrative registers, foreign 
pupils and population can be measured only through their share of the population with non-
Spanish nationality, therefore the objective population of the analysis refers only to foreign 
population and does not include other forms of immigrant background (i.e., based on pupils’ 
or their parents' country of origin). Table 1 shows the distribution of foreign pupils by world 










11 In Catalonia, in the course of 2013-14 the overall dissimilarity index of foreign students in primary education 
was 0.48, while for secondary education it was 0.39. The bigger size of secondary schools and a reduced number 
of schools explains this difference (Síndic de Greuges, 2016). 
12 Unfortunately, socioeconomic statistical data of catchment areas are not available.   
13 The world regions’ categories are those used by the Catalan Education Department.  
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Table 1. Foreign students by region of origin in primary education. Academic year 
2016-2017 













  % 
foreigners  
% n % n % n % n % n % n % n 






1 43,1 0,7 15 59,3 1361 10,4 238 14,2 327 0,8 18 1,5 34 13,2 302 
2 13,7 2,2 50 47,5 1061 18,7 417 4,4 99 0,9 21 4,7 106 21,4 478 
3 21,6 0,5 11 45,2 959 24,4 517 11,8 251 1,4 30 5,2 111 11,4 242 
4 7,6 3,7 27 23,0 168 23,4 171 3,4 25 1,6 12 15,7 115 29,2 214 
5 3,9 4,1 30 19,9 147 17,5 129 2,0 15 1,9 14 15,6 115 39,0 288 
6 9,9 2,0 17 26,4 230 26,3 229 5,9 51 1,0 9 6,7 58 31,8 277 
7 9,9 0,8 10 19,5 250 36,3 466 11,2 144 2,3 30 10,7 138 19,2 247 
8 21,4 0,2 4 22,7 530 40,7 950 13,9 324 6,0 141 9,0 210 7,4 173 
9 10,7 0,4 5 26,3 331 31,1 391 15,8 199 4,4 55 10,3 129 11,7 147 
10 14,9 1,0 25 35,5 927 18,0 469 11,5 300 1,6 41 9,2 240 23,4 610 
 
As the data included in the table show, pupils from both Asia and Oceania and Central and 
South America are the most represented sub-groups of foreign pupils in the city, as well as in 
each of the ten districts. To capture the heterogeneity of foreign pupils and how school 
segregation affects different sub-groups, we have constructed two additional school 
segregation measures for these sub-groups.  
 
All the measures in the regression analysis in Section 6 are percentages of the reference 
population and are centred by subtracting their mean14. Neighbourhoods were selected as units 
of analysis because they optimally capture school enrolment dynamics. While the average 
district population in Barcelona is 165,995 inhabitants, the neighbourhoods’ average 
population is 22,049 inhabitants. The income of the neighbourhoods is set at 100, which is the 
average income of the city of Barcelona15 and the variable low level of educational attainment 
																																																						
14	The reference population is given by the label of each variable included in the model.	Given the fact that all our 
independent variables are continuous and to foster the interpretation of the results, we have proceeded to centre 
the variables by subtracting their mean. This is a common practice, which also has the advantage of reducing 
collinearity issues.	
15 The mean of this indicator is 97.42, because we have excluded those neighbourhoods that have only one school, 
as reported at the end of Section 3. 
	 15 
refers to the share of people in the neighbourhood with lower secondary education as a highest 
level of attainment. Table 2 presents the summary statistics of the variables used. 
 
Table 2. Summary statistics. 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
School segregation (DI) index 61 0.331 0.113 0.020 0.590 
School segregation (DI) index Central and South America students 61 0.363 0.164 0.000 0.930 
School segregation (DI) index Asia and Oceania students 61 0.371 0.157 0.010 0.930 
Adjusted isolation index  61 0.089 0.065 0.000 0.280 
Adjusted isolation index Central and South America students 61 0.033 0.028 0.000 0.110 
Adjusted isolation index Asia and Oceania students 61 0.041 0.043 0.000 0.230 
Residential segregation index 61 0.126 0.056 0.010 0.310 
Income average 2015, base 100 61 97.416 45.107 34.500 250.500 
Low ed. attainment, % of population 61 47.193 16.107 18.400 80.600 
Foreign population, %  61 16.043 8.144 5.400 47.900 
Private enrolment, % 61 49.592 26.377 0.000 100.000 
Immigrants students, % 61 16.639 10.609 2.400 49.300 
 
 
For each neighbourhood, the Dissimilarity Indexes (DI) of residential and school segregation 
for foreign populations and foreign pupils were calculated as follows: 
 
!" = 12 &'( − *'+,'-.  
 
where &' is the number of foreign of the unit i (census sections16 in the case of residential 
segregation and schools in the case of school segregation), X is the number of foreigners in the 
neighbourhood, *' is the number of natives of the unit i, and Y is the total number of natives in 
the neighbourhood.  
 
																																																						
16 Census sections are administrative units used in Spanish statistical registers. These units divide each 
municipality into units, which range between 1,000 and 2,500 inhabitants.  
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In addition, the adjusted isolation index of residential and school segregation for foreign 
population and foreign pupils is calculated as: 
 
/" = " − 01 − 0 
 
where P is the percentage of foreigners in the neighbourhood and I is the isolation index, which 
is calculated as:  
" = &'( &'1','-.  
 
where 1' is the total population of the unit i (census sections in the case of residential 
segregation and schools in the case of school segregation). The adjusted isolation (AI) index is 
used, instead of the simple isolation index, because it allows for controlling of the different 
proportions of foreign and native pupils among the spatial units (neighbourhoods) included in 
the analysis (Iceland et al., 2002).  
 
Both measures (dissimilarity and adjusted isolation) have a range between 0 and 1. Higher 
values indicate higher levels of segregation of the reference group among the units or higher 
levels of concentration of foreign populations, respectively.  
 
The results reported in the article refer to different units. Barcelona is divided into 10 districts 
and a total of 73 neighbourhoods. The dissimilarity and isolation indexes refer to those 
neighbourhoods that have more than one school. For this reason, the final sample of 
neighbourhoods includes 61 cases (see Table A1 in the Appendix for details on the number of 
units in each neighbourhood).  
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Residential segregation and school segregation of foreign pupils in Barcelona 
 
The rapid increase in foreign population in Barcelona has directly affected school enrolments 
in the city. As Figure 2 shows, between 2001 and 2008 (before the economic crisis), the 
percentage of foreign pupils increased from 5.1% to 13.2%, then decreased slightly in the 
period of the economic crisis and stabilized after 2013-14. The evolution of foreign pupils 
enrolled in public and private schools reveals that public schools enrol a higher share of foreign 
pupils than subsidized private schools.17 Nowadays, 19.1% of pupils in public schools are 
foreign, while this proportion decreases to 5.3% in private ones. 
 
Figure 2. Evolution of the share of immigrant students in primary education by school 




Source: Author’s elaboration from CEB database. 
 
Figure 3 shows the spatial distribution of foreign populations and foreign pupils in the city, 
which is notably unequal among neighbourhoods. The neighbourhoods of the three poorest 
																																																						
17 Since the admission conditions for public and subsidized private schools are formally equal by law, we should 
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districts (1, 3 and 8) are those with the highest proportion of both foreign populations and 
foreign pupils enrolled. On the contrary, the neighbourhoods of the most affluent districts (4 
and 5) are those with fewer foreign residents and a residual presence of foreign pupils, whose 
numbers are significantly less than the proportion of foreign populations living in the districts.  
 
Figure 3: Distribution of the immigrant population as the percentage of total population 
and distribution of immigrant students as the percentage of total students in 





Source: Barcelona City Council Statistics and CEB database for 2016-17. 
 
 
Barcelona shows a notable divergence between residential (D=0.24) and school segregation 
(D=0.47), as well as between residential (AI=0.06) and school adjusted isolation (AI=0.18). 
School segregation is notably higher than residential segregation in most neighbourhoods and 
for all districts (Figure 4). The same occurs with the isolation of foreign pupils in schools, 
which is also higher than the residential isolation of foreign populations. However, these 
differences are higher in some neighbourhoods than others, for both segregation and isolation 
indexes. Again, although levels of residential segregation of foreign populations are moderate 
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compared to other European cities (see, for example, the cases of Dutch cities or Helsinki in 
this special issue), this does not exclude their importance in explaining school segregation 
patterns.  
 
Figure 4: Dissimilarity and isolation indexes of residential and school segregation of 
migrant populations in Barcelona.
 
 
Source: Authors’ own elaboration based on CEB data for 2016. 
 
 
Figure 5 confirms the existence of a positive but low correlation between residential and school 
segregation (r=0.27) in Barcelona. In both graphs, the bisector further shows how, in most 
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neighbourhoods, school segregation and isolation indexes are higher than the residential ones. 
However, it also shows that there is a significant dispersion in this relationship between 
neighbourhoods. Some of them display unequal levels of school segregation of foreign pupils, 
even in the context of similar levels of residential segregation. The same occurs with the school 
isolation index, which is notably higher than residential isolation (r=0.12) and very low in the 
city. 
Figure 5. Relationship between school and residential segregation according to 








These differences among neighbourhoods could confirm the existence of distinctive territorial 
dynamics within specific catchment areas which exacerbate processes of school segregation 
and isolation for foreign pupils in the city. While access to schooling is moulded by residential 
segregation, other factors have to be accounted for when trying to understand the school 
segregation and isolation processes for foreign pupils, with social, spatial and educational 
factors possibly interacting as complex drivers of spatial inequality. The next section focuses 
on the analysis of such aspects. 
 
Drivers of school segregation in Barcelona 
To observe how social and educational factors shape school segregation and isolation in 
Barcelona city neighbourhoods, we carry out a sequence of OLS regressions. The modelling 
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follows a sequential process to describe the complex interrelation of the phenomenon. We 
examine the dissimilarity index (DI) and the adjusted isolation index (AI) for foreign pupils 
(Tables 3 and 4). To account for the heterogeneity among different groups of foreign pupils, 
we construct two additional measures of DI and AI for the most represented groups (i.e., 
Central-South American and Asian and Oceanian). The results using these measures are 
reported in columns 4, 5 and 6 for Central-South American pupils and 7, 8 and 9 for Asian and 
Oceanian pupils. 
The variables are introduced sequentially; first, the socioeconomic and spatial characteristics 
of the neighbourhoods in columns 1, 4 and 7 (e.g., residential segregation -measured by the 
dissimilarity index-18, income level, share of population with low educational attainment and 
share of foreign population). As a second step, we add schooling system-related factors, such 
as the share of foreign pupils in the school and the share of private enrolment in the 
neighbourhood (columns 2, 5 and 8). Finally, in columns 3, 6 and 9, we examine the 
interactions between the variables that, in the general model, have a significant effect. Each 
parameter should be interpreted as a percentage change in the mean of the dependent factor for 
a single change in the independent factor under consideration (e.g., 0.2 should be interpreted 
as a 20% change).19  
Table 3 reports the estimates for the foreign pupils’ educational segregation in Barcelona. We 
focus on the effect of social characteristics of the neighbourhoods. Results show that the effect 
of residential segregation is significantly related to educational segregation (standardized 
coefficient 0.605, p<0.05). The result holds when controlling for school characteristics in 
column 2, leading to a slight decrease of 13% compared to the first model. This means that the 
																																																						
18 We have also constructed a measure for residential isolation, however the association between this variable and 
dependent variables were not significant. These results are available upon request to the authors. 
19 By centring the mean of the independent variables, the constant should be interpreted as the mean of the 
dependent variable when all the other covariates are set around their average values. 	
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average income, the share of the population with low educational attainment and the share of 
foreign populations have a non-significant effect on foreign pupils’ school segregation (DI) for 
the overall population. This is reinforced when we examine the difference in the variance 
accounted for in the model between column 1 and 2. Among the school-related factors, we find 
a positive effect of the share of private enrolment on school segregation (standardized 
coefficient 0.165, p<0.05). This effect decreases (standardized coefficient 0.153, p<0.05) when 
we add the interaction effect (column 3) between private enrolment and residential segregation. 
The interaction is not significant, which indicates that the effect of private enrolment on school 
segregation does not vary at different levels of residential segregation. However, the higher 
presence of private schools seems to be related to higher levels of school segregation. These 
results indicate that the presence of private providers is a more important driver of school 
segregation than residential segregation. The presence of private providers may be reinforcing 
and amplifying the effect of residential segregation by allowing native families to develop 
some level of social closure in private subsidized schools which are less accessible for foreign 
students due to their costs or to the existence of religious or cultural barriers. Another possible 
mechanism to explain the low impact of residential segregation on school segregation is the 
possibility of students moving to a different neighbourhood. In the case of Barcelona, the data 
available show that a significant percentage of students are enrolled in a school outside their 
catchment area of residence and that this mobility is significantly higher than in the case of 
non-foreign students (Bonal and Zancajo, 2019). 
When looking at the dissimilarity index for most represented minorities, we find two negative 
associations between low-educated population and income neighbourhoods for Central and 
South American pupils. However, this effect is very weak. In the case of Asian-Oceanian 
pupils, the percentage of private enrolment positively affects the dissimilarity index for this 
sub-group. However, when the interaction terms are included, this effect is not significant, 
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while the interaction between private enrolment and residential segregation shows a negative 
association with school segregation.  
In the light of the results presented in Table 3, the effect of residential segregation on school 
segregation (DI) is statistically significant only when all foreign pupils are analysed, while in 
the case of the most represented minorities (Central and South American and Asian-Oceanian), 
the effect is not significant.  
In Table 4, we follow the same sequential process as in Table 3 by considering the AI for 
foreign pupils in schools as a dependent variable. Among the social factors, we find that only 
the percentage of foreign population is related to the AI for the overall population in the 
neighbourhoods of Barcelona (column 1). When looking at the two most represented groups 
of foreign pupils, we find that neighbourhoods with a higher share of foreign population are 
associated with higher levels of educational isolation of Asian and Oceanian pupils 
(standardized coefficient -0.00192, p<0.01) as compared to those with very small foreign 
populations (column 7). Therefore, contrary to school segregation, foreign pupils’ isolation 
does not seem to be affected by the level of residential segregation and only by the percentage 
of foreign population when neighbourhoods’ characteristics are considered (column 8), as well 
as the percentage of low-educated population in the case of Asian-Oceanian pupils.  
School-related factors are relevant for explaining educational isolation as shown in columns 2, 
5 and 8. We find a positive and significant effect regarding the share of foreign pupils for the 
overall population (standardized coefficient 0.521, p<0.01, e.g., column 2). The same 
association holds for the educational isolation of the two most represented groups of pupils, 
that being for Central and South American pupils (standardized coefficient 0.236, p<0.01, 
column 5) and for Asian and Oceanian pupils (standardized coefficient 0.32, p<0.01, column 
8).  
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The share of private education enrolment has an effect on foreign pupils’ isolation 
(standardized coefficient 0.079, p<0.05, column 2). When we include the interaction effect 
between the share of private educational enrolment and the percentage of foreign pupils, we 
find that both the sizes of the main effects increase by 18% and 14% respectively and the 
interaction is significant (standardized coefficient 0.78, p<0.05). Therefore, we find that the 
share of foreign pupils and private enrolment is positively associated with the level of 
educational isolation. Additionally, the interaction effect shows that higher levels of both 
independent factors have a significant effect on higher educational isolation. The results report 
a significant interaction between private educational enrolment and foreign pupils when 
analysing the AI of Asian-Oceanian pupils (standardized coefficient 0.5, p<0.05, column 9). 
In short, foreign pupils’ isolation seems to be affected, contrary to foreign’ school segregation, 
not just by the presence of private schools and the share of foreign pupils in the neighbourhood, 
but also by the combination of these factors. This means that the effect of private schools on 
foreign pupils’ isolation is greater when the neighbourhood exceeds a threshold of foreign 
pupils. It could be hypothesized that private schools are demanded by non-foreign families as 
a strategy to avoid school diversity only in those neighbourhoods where the proportion of 
foreign students is perceived as a threat to schools’ social homogeneity. 
These analyses confirm that residential and educational segregation are two interrelated 
phenomena in Barcelona. In addition, the supply of private subsidized schooling in the 
neighbourhood (here reflected by the share of pupils enrolled) is a main factor in understanding 
both educational segregation and isolation. Differences are reinforced in those neighbourhoods 
where both foreign population and private education enrolment are highly concentrated. 
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Table 3. Drivers of school segregation of foreign students in Barcelona city neighbourhoods. 
 
 DI Tot. DI Central-South America DI Asia-Oceania 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
          
Residential segr. 0.605** 0.582** 0.506* 0.384 0.349 0.260 0.373 0.337 0.0893 
 (0.267) (0.269) (0.290) (0.382) (0.411) (0.445) (0.358) (0.376) (0.397) 
Foreign pop., % -0.000618 -0.00492 -0.00421 -0.00279 -0.00324 -0.00241 -0.00236 -0.00573 -0.00341 
 (0.00180) (0.00355) (0.00370) (0.00257) (0.00543) (0.00567) (0.00241) (0.00496) (0.00506) 
Low educ. pop, % -0.00186 -0.00294 -0.00250 -0.00629** -0.00641** -0.00591* -0.000984 -0.00184 -0.000425 
 (0.00191) (0.00196) (0.00206) (0.00274) (0.00300) (0.00316) (0.00257) (0.00274) (0.00282) 
Income neigh. -0.000571 -0.000891 -0.000760 -0.00208** -0.00222** -0.00207* 0.000806 0.000495 0.000925 
 (0.000674) (0.000664) (0.000692) (0.000964) (0.00102) (0.00106) (0.000905) (0.000929) (0.000946) 
Foreign stud., %  0.505 0.421  0.0647 -0.0333  0.402 0.128 
  (0.330) (0.352)  (0.505) (0.540)  (0.462) (0.481) 
Priv. ed. enroll., %  0.165** 0.153**  0.0575 0.0434  0.151* 0.112 
  (0.0628) (0.0653)  (0.0961) (0.100)  (0.0878) (0.0893) 
Priv. ed. enroll., %* Residential segr   -0.735   -0.859   -2.406* 
   (1.028)   (1.576)   (1.406) 
Constant 0.331*** 0.331*** 0.333*** 0.363*** 0.363*** 0.365*** 0.371*** 0.371*** 0.377*** 
 (0.0143) (0.0136) (0.0139) (0.0205) (0.0208) (0.0213) (0.0192) (0.0190) (0.0190) 
          
Observations 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 
R-squared 0.090 0.208 0.216 0.112 0.118 0.123 0.147 0.196 0.238 
R-squared Adj 0.0246 0.120 0.112 0.0488 0.0200 0.00713 0.0857 0.107 0.137 
Standard errors in parentheses 










Table 4. Drivers of school isolation of foreign students in Barcelona city neighbourhoods. 
 
 CI Tot CI Central-South America CI Asia-Oceania 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
          
Residential segr. 0.137 0.194 0.230* -0.0135 0.0207 0.0330 0.0523 0.104 0.127 
 (0.144) (0.140) (0.136) (0.0631) (0.0620) (0.0614) (0.0960) (0.0968) (0.0947) 
Foreign pop., % 0.00172* -0.00299 -0.00341* -0.000519 -0.00268*** -0.00282*** 0.00192*** -0.00103 -0.00130 
 (0.000971) (0.00185) (0.00179) (0.000425) (0.000818) (0.000809) (0.000647) (0.00128) (0.00125) 
Low educ. pop, % -0.000182 -0.00133 -0.000554 -0.000153 -0.000678 -0.000416 -0.000898 -0.00161** -0.00111 
 (0.00103) (0.00102) (0.00105) (0.000452) (0.000452) (0.000472) (0.000688) (0.000706) (0.000729) 
Income neigh. -0.000531 -0.000612* -0.000153 -0.000314* -0.000325** -0.000170 -0.000387 -0.000385 -9.08e-05 
 (0.000364) (0.000346) (0.000393) (0.000159) (0.000153) (0.000177) (0.000242) (0.000239) (0.000274) 
Foreign stud., %  0.521*** 0.599***  0.236*** 0.263***  0.320*** 0.370*** 
  (0.172) (0.170)  (0.0762) (0.0766)  (0.119) (0.118) 
Priv. ed. enroll., %  0.0790** 0.0954***  0.0264* 0.0319**  0.0297 0.0402* 
  (0.0327) (0.0324)  (0.0145) (0.0146)  (0.0226) (0.0226) 
Priv. ed. enroll, %* Foreign 
stud.., % 
  0.780**   0.263   0.500** 
   (0.352)   (0.159)   (0.245) 
Constant 0.0892*** 0.0892*** 0.0979*** 0.0330*** 0.0330*** 0.0359*** 0.0410*** 0.0410*** 0.0466*** 
 (0.00773) (0.00707) (0.00788) (0.00338) (0.00313) (0.00356) (0.00515) (0.00489) (0.00549) 
          
Observations 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 
R-squared 0.189 0.345 0.400 0.187 0.328 0.361 0.176 0.282 0.334 
R-squared Adj 0.131 0.272 0.321 0.129 0.253 0.277 0.117 0.202 0.246 
Standard errors in parentheses 






As in many other cities, school segregation of foreign students in Barcelona has increased in 
the last two decades, as the number of foreign students in the education system augmented 
rapidly. Urban inequalities in the city are significant in certain neighbourhoods and there is a 
positive association between residential and school segregation of foreign students. Our 
analysis shows that spatial educational inequalities cannot be explained simply by the territorial 
dispersion of foreign populations in the urban space. It also highlights the importance of 
exploring the role of other potential educational and non-educational drivers that foster the 
unequal distribution of foreign students. The analysis is highly relevant since other studies in 
Spain have shown that the level of concentration of foreign students significantly affects 
educational performance (Cebolla and Garrido, 2011; Calero and Escardíbul, 2016).  
 
Our results report that the moderate effects of residential segregation on school segregation are 
not necessarily the result of the higher number of schools available for families’ choices. Our 
findings are consistent with other studies that cast doubt on the capacity of school choice to 
reduce the effects of residential segregation on school segregation (Frankenberg, 2013; 
Söderström and Uusitalo, 2010). Greater school choice tends to favour middle-class social 
distinction strategies, which lead to more possibilities of opting out of local schools (Boterman, 
2013; Gerdes, 2013). Indeed, school choice may reduce the weight of residential segregation 
in terms of explaining school segregation; but, far from allowing foreign students to escape 
from their neighbourhood, it may increase school segregation via middle-class ‘white flight’. 
Research has shown that patterns of school choice and the way in which families enact school 
choice policies are socially influenced (Ball, 2003; Schneider et al., 2002). Different social or 
ethnic groups react to an increasing capacity of school choice in very different and unequal 
ways, which can increase rather than reduce school segregation. In the case of Barcelona, 
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school choice has enabled middle-class and native families to avoid those schools that enrol 
higher proportions of foreign students.  
 
The high presence of private subsidized schools seems to play a decisive role in explaining 
higher levels of school segregation in city neighbourhoods: the higher the level of enrolment 
in private schools, the higher the school segregation of foreign students, as well as the higher 
their level of isolation. However, in order to understand how processes of school segregation 
work, it is necessary to scrutinize how local education markets operate. The particular 
characteristics of school admissions policy in Barcelona make the analysis of choice patterns 
within catchment areas particularly noteworthy. The weight of proximity in prioritizing school 
access and its coexistence with significant margins of school choice in the city make the study 
of the micro-dynamics of school choice and segregation of particular interest. Differences in 
the school segregation of foreign students vary between neighbourhoods, with similar indexes 
of residential segregation and even a similar proportion of public and private school enrolment. 
This fact calls for undertaking further analyses of how local education markets (with different 
school characteristics in terms of pedagogic diversity, educational quality or socioeconomic 
characteristics of the population) generate stronger or weaker processes of segregation among 
native and foreign students. 
 
Our findings also contribute to the international debate regarding the relationship between 
school choice and school segregation. As the case of Barcelona exemplifies, a greater capacity 
of school choice, in terms of choice options or private subsidized alternatives, is not necessarily 
a silver bullet solution for school segregation. The relationship between school choice and 
school segregation is complex and the analysis needs to focus on contextual factors at city and 
neighbour levels to better understand it. Both, educational (e.g. the presence of private schools) 
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and non-educational factors (e.g., neighbourhood socioeconomic characteristics or residential 
segregation) may affect significantly how school choice possibilities enact families’ choices 
and their ultimate effects on school segregation.  
 
Of course, our study is not without limitations. We have limited information on the country of 
origin of foreign students. We also cannot account for measures of entropy within the unit of 
analysis considered, which we suspect may have a relevant effect on the phenomena of 
educational segregation and isolation. Despite these limitations, this study has presented cross-
neighbourhood evidence of the effect of educational and social differentiation on education 
phenomena in the city, while providing useful information for policymakers who wish to 
address and reduce the school segregation of foreign students. Providing detailed policy 
recommendations is beyond the scope of this paper but we can point to two key lessons that 
are directly linked to our findings. The first refers to the need to revise the effectiveness and 
equity of catchment areas. They are quite ineffective if wide margins of school choice are 
allowed. In the poorest districts, families seem to have many possibilities of opting out of local 
schools, which potentially increases segregation and reduces the value of proximity. In line 
with what other studies have suggested (Taylor, 2009; Elacqua et al., 2011), redefining the 
catchment areas (increasing their total number and making them smaller) and restricting the 
white flight possibilities of the middle class would probably help to reduce the school 
segregation and isolation of foreign students in the city. Recent simulations exploring the 
effects of pupils attending the closest school to their home in the case of Barcelona reveal a 




The second lesson refers specifically to the need to ensure mechanisms of redistribution of 
foreign students among schools, and especially between public and private subsidized schools. 
Mechanisms to ensure a better balance between the two sectors and within each sector are 
necessary if equality of educational opportunities is to be granted. As has been previously 
argued, current regulations include the possibility of establishing minimum thresholds of SEN 
pupils per classroom, with the objective of ensuring their balanced distribution among schools. 
However, systems of detection are poorly developed and mechanisms of redistribution of SEN 
students are only implemented by a few municipalities (Bonal, 2012). In Barcelona, there is 
evidence that the local education authority (CEB) is developing dynamic policies to improve 
educational equity and reduce school segregation in the city. However, the potential success of 
these initiatives will largely depend on the active resistance of interest groups, as well as on 
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